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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Double Jeopardy-State statute al-
lowing reprosecution on original indictment in new trial after
conviction of lesser offense reversed, invalid under fourteenth
amendment-United States v. Wilkins (2d Cir. 1965).
George Hetenyi was tried in New York for first degree
murder, but was convicted only of second degree murder. He
appealed this conviction and it was reversed because of errors
committed by the state. He was tried a second time under the
original indictment and was convicted of first degree murder.
Again the conviction was reversed. A third trial resulted in a
conviction of second degree murder-the same as in the first
trial and the judgment was affirmed by the New York courts.
In federal habeas corpus proceedings Hetenyi then challenged
the constitutionality of the New York statute which permitted
these reprosecutions.1 The district court denied Hetenyi's appli-
cation for a writ.2 On appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, held, reversed. Although Het-
enyi was finally convicted of the lesser charge of second degree
murder, there was a reasonable possibility that he was prejudiced
by the mere fact that he was unconstitutionally charged with
the greater crime of first degree murder in the third trial and
this possibility deprived Hetenyi of liberty without due process
of law. United States v. Wilkins, 348 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1965)
(2-to-1), cert. denied, 34 U.S.L. WEEK (U.S. Feb. 22, 1966).
The Supreme Court has never invalidated a state conviction
on the ground of reprosecution for the same offense. The leading
case in this area of the law is Palko v. Connecticut.3 In that case,
as in United States v. Wilkins,4 the defendant was indicted and
tried for first degree murder but was found guilty of second
degree murder. The conviction was reversed because of errors
and the defendant was retried on the original indictment and
convicted of first degree murder. Although the essential facts
are identical to the facts in Wilkins, the dominant issues are
different. In Palko the state appealed and the only question
decided was whether a Connecticut statute permitting state ap-
1. N.Y. CODE OF CRrMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 464, 544 (1958).
2. United States v. Wilkins, 227 F. Supp. 460 (W.D.N.Y. 1964).
3. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
4. 348 F.2d 844, 850 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 34 U.S.L. WE= 3283
(U.S. Feb. 22, 1966).
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peals in criminal cases was an infringement of the fourteenth
amendment. The Court discussed Palko's contention that the
fourteenth amendment incorporated the fifth, but said that the
fourteenth only absorbed specific provisions of the Bill of Rights
when "neither justice nor liberty would exist if they were sacri-
ficed."5 The statute in question did not subject Palko to "a hard-
ship so acute and shocking that our polity will not endure it."O
The state was attempting to obtain a trial free from error, a
right which the defendant would also have.
In 1937 when Palko was decided, the controlling decision on
the question of state reprosecution for the same offense was the
1910 case of Brantley v. Georgia.7 In that case the defendant was
tried for murder and was found guilty of voluntary man-
slaughter. Upon his appeal the conviction was reversed and a
new trial was ordered. He was retried under the original indict-
ment and found guilty of murder. The Supreme Court held that
such a reprosecution "was not a case of twice in jeopardy under
any view of the Constitution of the United States.",, Brantley
relied solely on the premises raised by Trono v. United States,9
in which the Court held that the fifth amendment did not pro-
hibit this kind of reprosecution, even for federal authorities,
where the accused by his own appeal obtained a reversal of the
conviction. By his own appeal, the Court said, the defendant
waived his rights under the fifth amendment.
In 1957 Trono was undermined by Green v. United States,0
where in a five to four decision the Court held that the fifth
amendment prohibited the accused from being reprosecuted in a
federal prosecution for first degree murder following a convic-
tion of a lesser and included offense even though the acaused
had appealed. By limiting Trono to its particular facts, the Court
avoided expressly overruling it, but the proposition for which
it stood was clearly reversed."' Green held that the kind of re-
5. Palko v. Connecticut, supra note 3, at 326.
6. Id. at 328.
7. 217 U.S. 284 (1910).
8. Id. at 285.
9. 199 U.S. 521 (1905). Specifically, the Court said of the Philippine statute:
[T]he phrase in question was to be construed as the same phrase would
be construed in the instrument from which it was originally taken, viz.,
the Constitution of the United States ... and not as it might possibly be
construed with reference to Spanish law or Spanish procedure.
Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905).
10. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
11. Id. at 190.
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prosecution in Wilkins, if conducted by federal authorities,
would violate the fifth amendment.
The precise issue of whether a state may reprosecute an indi-
vidual for first degree murder where a conviction of second
degree murder has been successfully appealed has yet to be de-
cided by the Supreme Court. Circuit Judge Marshall in Wilkins
said that the answer to this question might be gleaned from
"premises and presumptions revealed in those Supreme Court
cases in which a double jeopardy claim was interposed against
a state" or "from the doctrine of selective incorporation.'
2
There is no doubt that the Court recognizes an element of
double jeopardy in the concept of fourteenth amendment due
process.' 3 The recent decisions leave little room to believe that
"our polity will endure," any longer this pattern of reprosecu-
tion.14 In the Green case, the Court found no legitimate interest
of society to justify such a reprosecution by federal authorities.
Indeed it was found to place an unconscionable limitation on a
"vital societal interest"-assuring the accused a fair trial free
from legal error prejudicing his substantive rights. This interest
would be endangered because no matter how gross the legal error
which prejudiced him, appeal by the accused would give the
prosecution a "second chance" to get a conviction on the greater
charge. The Court in Green called this dilemma "incredible." It
is not likely that the same dilemma in a state court will be any
less incredible.
The Supreme Court may decide a question of state reprosecu-
tion, such as that raised in Vilkins, on the basis of one of three
standards. The first two involve the doctrine of incorporation,
the third does not. First, under a federal standard, the Court
may decide that the fifth amendment provision against double
jeopardy is incorporated, as such, into the fourteenth and the
states are required to adhere to federal requirements. Second, the
Court may decide that only the "basic core" of the double
jeopardy clause is incorporated and that while the states are not
held strictly to federal requirements there are definite limits to
their authority. Third, the Court may apply a "fundamental
12. United States v. Wilkins, mepra note 4, at 850.
13. E.g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 129 (1959).
14. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (comment on failure to
testify); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to confrontation);
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (self incrimination). Can it be reason-
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fairness" standard. Under this standard only those prohibitions
against double jeopardy inherent in the fourteenth amendment
would be considered. The test that would be applied would be
essentially the same as that applied by the Court in Palko. Under
this standard the Court still could declare such reprosecutions
unconstitutional simply by making the value judgment, as did
Judge Marshall in 'Wilkins, that our societal values have evolved
to a degree where such a reprosecution is thought to be funda-
mentally unfair.15 In 'Wilkins the Court declined to apply a
standard. It simply said Hetenyi's detention is unconstitutional
"under any of the three standards.' 16
Affirmance of the result reached in Wilkins would have a
major impact upon state laws. Of the thirty-eight states which
have considered the question, half of them have allowed this
pattern of reprosecution.' 7 Some of them, like New York, have
statutes authorizing it.'1 Others, like South Carolina, follow the
common law rule that a defendant waives jeopardy when he
appeals.'9 Some states have provided for it in their constitu-
tions. 20 Since the Court must upset that much law just to affirm
the doctrine laid down in lVilkins and since the tendency is
toward full incorporation, there is a good chance it will go all
the way and incorporate the double jeopardy clause with the
full force of the federal standard, sounding the death knell to
Palko v. Connecticut and other doubtful precedents which have
already been considerably eroded by the application of the doc-
trine of selective incorporation. 21
InviN ID. PAmNm
15. United States v. Wilkins, supra note 4, at 853.
16. Id. at 856.
17. For the state law prior to Green, see generally Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 1141
(1958). Since 1958 New Jersey and Arizona have decided the question for the
first time. New Jersey barred the reprosecution. State v. Williams, 30 N.J.
105, 152 A.2d 9 (1959). Arizona allowed it. State v. Thomas, 88 Ariz. 269,
356 P.2d 20 (1960). Washington overruled a prior decision and barred the
reprosecution. State v. Schoel, 54 Wash. 2d 388, 341 P.2d 481 (1959).
18. Supra note 1.
19. State v. Gillis, 73 S.C. 318, 53 S.E. 487 (1906) ; State v. Steadman, 216
S.C. 579, 59 S.E.2d 168 (1950).
20. These states are Colorado, Georgia, Mississippi and Missouri.
21. See generally, Henkin, "Selective Incorporatton" in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1963).
19661
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CRIMINAL LAW-Admission of Confessions-Ultimate deci-
sion upon voluntariness must be left to jury-United States v.
Inman (4th Cir. 1965).
The defendant was convicted of transporting a stolen car in
interstate commerce in violation of the federal statute.' The dis-
trict judge in the jury's absence heard evidence concerning the
signing of a confession and determined it to have been made
voluntarily. The jury was recalled and the confession was proved.
In its charge to the jury the court did not mention the volun-
tariness of the confession. On appeal to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, held, reversed. When any
confession is offered in a criminal proceeding, even though no
objection is made, the court should order the jury to withdraw;
evidence of the circumstances of the confession then must be
heard. Unless the court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt
that the confession is voluntary, it may not be admitted as evi-
dence; if, however, the court is persuaded that the confession
is voluntary, it may be put before the jury with an instruction
that the jury must find the confession voluntary before they
may consider it. United States v. Inman, 352 F.2d 954 (4th Cir.
1965). (3-to-O).
Three methods of protecting the accused against the use of
involuntary confessions in criminal proceedings have appeared.
First is the so-called Wigmore or "orthodox" rule in which
the judge hears all the evidence and rules on voluntariness, the
jury considering voluntariness as affecting the weight of the
confession; this is apparently the rule followed by the trial judge
in the instant case. Second is the Massachusetts or "humane" rule
in which the judge rules on voluntariness and, if he finds it
voluntary, instructs the jury that it too must find the confession
voluntary before considering it as evidence; this is the approach
called for by the present decision. Third is the New York rule
in which the judge admits the confession if there is evidence as
to voluntariness over which reasonable men could differ.
It was the New York rule which was invalidated by the United
States Supreme Court in Jaokson v. Denno2 because "it is impos-
sible to discover whether the jury found the confession voluntary
and relied upon it, or involuntary and supposedly ignored it" a
and because "there is nothing to show that [the question of
1. 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1964).
2. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
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voluntariness was] resolved at all. . .. ,4 The two other rules on
the admissibility of confessions, however, were approved by im-
plication.
It is not clear which rule the Fourth Circuit had employed
prior to United States v. Inman.6 Apparently the Massachusetts
rule was followed in Denny v. United States.7 The court
"found no reason to reject the determination of the district
court"58 where the trial judge told the jury to disregard the con-
fession which had been introduced unless they found that the
defendant had made it voluntarily. The later case of United
States v. Bmith9 threw doubt on the proper rule to be applied.
Here the trial judge had charged that as a matter of law the
confession, if made, was voluntary. "Whether in fact [the de-
fendant] made the admissions was left to the jury under appro-
priate safeguards. The absolute instruction [that the confession
was voluntary] was quite justified."10 Thus the Fourth Circuit
appeared to sanction, if not adopt, the orthodox rule.
The recent Inman decision was the first view of the matter by
the Fourth Circuit since Jackson v. Dennol and it might have
been supposed that the Supreme Court case had not compelled
a choice between the orthodox and Massachusetts rules as a
matter of constitutional dimension. However the Inman court
implied that the orthodox rule might present "grave questions of
Constitutional law, such as whether the entitlement to a jury
trial does not compel jury determination of the validity of a
confession' 2 and therefore relied on the Massachusetts rule as
approved by the circuit in Denny.
In following the Massachusetts rule the court thought the
matter vital enough to due process to override the provisions of
Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that re-
quests for instructions shall be made at the close of the evidence
or earlier-a requirement not met at the trial. As a further con-
sequence of the problem in Inman, the court reaffirmed its ear-
4. Id. at 379, 380.
5. See Id. at 378 n. 8.
6. 352 F.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1965).
7. 151 F.2d 828 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 777 (1946).
8. Id. at 833.
9. 303 F.2d 341 (4th Cir. 1962).
10. Id. at 343.
11. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
12. 352 F.2d 954, 956 (4th Cir. 1965).
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lier decision in Stevenson v. Boles"3 that, whether requested or
not, the jury must be instructed that an involuntary confession
may not be considered as evidence.
PALM R. HUMAIm
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-Appellate Review of Valid Sen-
tence-Under 28 U.S.C. § 2106 federal appellate court may re-
duce death sentence to life imprisonment. Coleman v. United
States (D.C. Cir. 1965).
Appellant was convicted in 1960 of the first degree murder
of a police officer in the District of Columbia. The conviction
was affirmed by the court of appeals. During the pendency of
this appeal the mandatory death sentence was abolished, and
determination of whether the sentence should be death or life
imprisonment was left to the jury. Congress also provided that
cases tried before the abolition and which were before the court
for sentencing or resentencing should be governed by the prior
law, but that the judge could, after considering circumstances in
mitigation and aggravation, impose a life sentence if he thought
it justified.'
Under the new law appellant moved for relief from his death
sentence. The district court denied relief, and appellant again
went to the court of appeals, which remanded the case to the
district court for a consideration of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances. The district court again denied the motion and
left the death sentence in effect. On appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, held, sentence
reduced to life imprisonment under the authority of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2106. Coleman v. United States, __ F.2d - (D. C. Cir. 1965).
(6-to-3).
Section 2106 provides:
The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdic-
tion may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any
judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought before
it for review, and may remand the cause and direct the entry
of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order ....
This section has never been used to reduce a sentence validly
imposed2 except in one other case8 also decided by the Court of
1. 22 D.C. CODE § 2404 (1965).
2. The section had hitherto been used only for such action as ordering a new
trial, Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950), and remanding for resen-
tence, Ballew v. United States, 160 U.S. 187 (1895).
3. Frady & Gordon v. United States, 348 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1965). The
convictions were free from error, but death sentences were invalidly imposed
due to (1) the court's instructions on unanimity and (2) the inadequacy of the
jury poll. Since it was impossible to reconvene the same jury, and since a
new jury could not perform the function, and since the trial judge could not
decide punishment (as the amended code requires the jury to do it), the court
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Appeals for the District of Columbia. In fact, federal courts
have no power to modify a sentence which is within the limits
of the applicable statute.4 Speaking of this, the United States
Supreme Court recently said: "This court has no such power."5
The situation presented to the court of appeals by this case
is unique and unlikely to recur: the law changed during appeal;
the trial judge died during appeal; and the judge appointed to
make a determination under the amended law twice refused to
reduce the death penalty. Due to this novelty of situation the
case is valueless as a precedent in all but one aspect-the court's
use of section 2106 to modify a sentence imposed within the
limits of law.
The reasons given by the court of appeals for disturbing the
sentence appear tenuous. First, the court thought it error for
the district judge to make appellant carry the burden of convinc-
ing the court to reduce the sentence; the judge, they stated,
should have availed himself of all relevant information in order
to determine the proper sentence. The dissent felt that the judge
sustained this burden at the hearing by permitting inquiry into
a wide scope of circumstances in mitigation and aggravation.
Second, the court thought it error for the district judge to give
weight to the law as it was at the time of the trial. The judge,
they said, should have imposed punishment under the new law,
and should have given no weight to the mandatory death sen-
tence of the prior law. This conclusion is reached, however, by
examining certain language in the judge's memorandum---"the
sentence shall be governed by the provisions of law in effect
prior to the effective date of the amendment"-which is equally
capable of being simply a paraphrase of the statute expressly
stating this to be the law unless the judge finds a life sentence
justified.
Third, the court of appeals found inconsistencies in the judge's
language: In one place the judge said, "if factors of a mitigating
character were present . . ." and later he said, "upon consid-
4. E.g., United States v. Pruitt, 341 F.2d 700 (4th Cir. 1965); Martin v.
United States, 317 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1963) ; Smith v. United States, 273 F.2d
462 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 846 (1960); Egan v. United
States, 268 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 868 (1959);
United States v. Kapsalis, 214 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, Robinson
v. United States 349 U.S. 906 (1955); United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d
583 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838, rehearing denied, 344 U.S. 889
(1952).
5. Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958).
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eration of all the circumstances in mitigation and in aggrava-
tion .... '8 It concluded from these inconsistencies that the
judge had not properly weighed the mitigating and aggravating
factors to see if the former outweighed the latter. However, the
judge wrote a detailed memorandum stating that in his opinion
none of the factors-absence of premeditation, the fact that ap-
pellant was unarmed, that the homicide was unplanned, that
appellant was mentally retarded, that appellant was intoxicated,
and that appellant had been a model prisoner-mitigated against
the murder of the policeman.
Having decided to disturb the sentence the court of appeals
had four possible courses: (1) to grant a new trial; (2) to re-
mand for designation of another judge to hold a hearing to
resentence appellant; (3) to remand to the district judge who
had twice refused to reduce the sentence; (4) to dispose of the
case itself. The court thought option (1) unnecessary in order to
cure the errors respecting sentence; it considered (2) beyond
its authority; and (3) was obviously distasteful. The court was
left with (4), and since for reasons discussed above it could not
sustain the death penalty, it put into effect the only other pos-
sible authorized sentence-life imprisonment.
The court of appeals in this case is really saying that it dis-
agrees with the district judge in his assessment of factors in
mitigation and aggravation. But sixty years of undeviating fed-
eral precedent show that an appellate federal court has no power
to reduce a valid sentence. The court in the instant case had no
authority to substitute its judgment for that of the district judge
in the matter of sentencing.
It is hard to disagree with the dissenting opinion that the
justification for imposition of a life sentence is "completely
without legal foundation,"9 that in using section 2106 the court
acted "only from expediency and with grave shortsightedness"'0
and that "the exceptions which will be developed b such a sub-
jective standard can only depend on the likes, dislikes, prejudices,
and sympathies of judges who, however well-intentioned, are in
fact substituting a personal philosophy . . . for Acts of Con-
gress.""
S. Tuo-KR McCAvy
8. Id. at -.
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-Release on Bail Pending Appeal-
Refusal of professional bondsmen to write bond pending appeal
merely because appellant has begun serving his sentence justifies
release on personal bond signed by appellant and any two close
relatives. McCoy v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1966).
The petitioner James McCoy was convicted of unauthorized use
of an automobile and contempt of court. He appealed and the
district court granted bail in the amount of 500 dollars. Since
he had already begun serving his sentence, professional bondsmen
refused to write the bond believing that he would flee the juris-
diction if his appeal failed. McCoy then petitioned the court of
appeals for release on personal recognizance.1 The record showed
that he had no previous adult convictions, that he was a lifelong
resident within the jurisdiction, and that he resided with his
mother, brother, grandfather and two aunts. The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Aeld, petition
granted.2 It would be manifestly unjust to permit the profes-
sional bondsman to withhold bond simply because the petitioner
has already begun to serve his sentence. McCoy v. United States,
__ F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1966). (3-to-1 concurring in part).
The right to bail in federal courts is guaranteed by Rule 46 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 46(a) (1) pro-
vides, as do most state laws,3 the absolute right to bail before
conviction, except in capital cases. Rule 46(a) (2) allows bail,
pending appeal, unless "the appeal is frivolous or taken for
delay." There, granting of bail is within the discretionary power
of the court,4 but "should be denied only in cases in which, from
substantial evidence, it seems clear that the right to bail may be
abused or the community threatened by the applicant's release." 5
1. "The procedure whereby the accused is granted liberty upon his execution
of a personal bond in the bail amount without being required to supply addi-
tional assurances of his presence at trial in the form of a surety bond or other
acceptable securities." REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON
POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, at 74 (1963).
2. See text accompanying note 28 infra for the terms of release.
3. E.g., S.C. CONST., art. 1, § 20. For a complete list of state provisions
see Note, Bail: An Ancient Practice Reexamined, 70 YALE L.J. 966, Appendix
(1961).
4. Ward v. United States, 76 Sup. Ct. 1063 (1956). See S.C. CODE ANN.
§7-8 (1962) which provides an absolute right to bail pending appeal "except that
no bail shall be allowed when the defendant shall have been sentenced to death,
life imprisonment or for a term exceeding ten years." However, in State v.
Whitener, 225 S.C. 244, 81 S.E.2d 784 (1954), it was held that the South
Carolina Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant bail where the sentence
exceeds ten years.
5. Leigh v. United States, 82 Sup. Ct. 994, 996 (1962). Cf. Williams v.
United States, 184 F.2d 280, 282-83 (2d Cir. 1950) where Mr. Justice Jackson,
11
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The burden of proving the applicant a "poor" risk is on the
United States.6 If bail is granted Rule 46(c) provides that it
should be allowed in an amount which "will insure the presence
of the defendant." The criteria for setting the amount of bail
are the nature and circumstance of the offense charged, the
weight of the evidence against the accused, his financial ability
to give bail and his general character.
In the early common law, bail was an informal procedure
whereby the sheriff would release the accused to the custody of
a third party. The "bail" became bound for the accused's pres-
ence in court and if the accused escaped he was required to sur-
render himself instead. Although it was uncommon to keep
prisoners in jail, the sheriff was free to exercise his discretion.7
The first attempt to regulate bail was in 1275 when the Statute
of Westminster classified offenses as bailable or non-bailable.8
Subsequent English statutes codified the procedure for obtaining
bail 9 and established the protection against excessive bail.10 Dur-
ing this transitional period the administration of bail passed to
the court and the nature of the surety's obligation evolved into a
promise to pay money if the accused failed to appear.,1
This concept of bail carried over into America. It became
apparent, however, as society became more mobile and as the
frontier expanded, that many defendants were unable to find a
person willing to offer himself as security. As a consequence,
the commercial surety came into being. He would supply bond
in return for a premium or percentage of the bail and the accused
would obtain his freedom. In addition to his fee, the professional
bondsman would often require some form of collateral security
to protect against forfeiture. The risk involved was not great,
however, since many courts did not hesitate to waive or refund
denying an application for bail pending appeal, observed: "Imprisonment to
protect society from predicted but unconsummated offense is so unprecedented
in this country and so fraught with danger of excesses and injustice that I am
loath to resort to it."
6. Ward v. United States, supra note 4.
7. See 2 PoLLocx & MArrLAN, THE HisToRy oF ENGLISH LAW 584-90
(2d ed. 1899). For an excellent discussion of the history of bail see Foote, The
Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: 1, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 959, 965-89 (1965).
See also Sullivan, Proposed Rule 46 and the Right to Bail, 3 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 919 (1963) ; Note, Bail: An Ancient Practice Reexamined, mipra note 3.
8. 3 Edw. 1 c. 15 (1275).
9. 1 & 2 Philip and Mary c. 13 (1554) in FREED & WAxlk, BAIL IN THE
UNITED STATES: 1964, 1.
10. I Win. & Mary c. 2 sec. 1, 2 (10) (1688) in Famm & WAp, op. cit. supra
note 9.
11. Note, Bail: An Ancient Practice Reexamined, supra note 3, at 967.
1966]
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forfeitures where it appeared that the bondsman had been dili-
gent in preventing the accused's escape.
12
Gradually the professional bondsman's control over bail proce-
dure has become exclusive. Those who are adjudged poor risks
by the bondsman remain in jail.13 Consequently, the ultimate
decision of whether the accused is released from custody is deter-
mined by a private independent businessman and not by a court
of law. 14 In an attempt to curb the abusive features which are
inherent in such a system, states' 5 have enacted licensing regu-
lations which set maximum premium rates and require bonds-
men to make a statement of sufficient assets. The bondsman must
also show good moral character. Where no regulation exists the
bondsman need only satisfy local courts that he is solvent.16
The federal system requires a certificate of authority to write
bonds in federal court, 17 but is dependent upon the states for
further regulatory measures.
The United States Senate has proposed changes in the federal
bail procedure which would, in effect, have the accused pay the
premium to the court rather than to a bondsman. Senate Bill
1357's would provide for the following:
1. Personal recognizance, to include a written promise to
appear;
2. Execution of an unsecured appearance bond;
3. Execution of an appearance bond seconded by a cash deposit
or other security equal to ten percent of the amount of bail
fixed, refundable upon appearance ;19
12. Id. at 967-68.
13. Pannell v. United States, 320 F.2d 698, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (concurring
opinion).
14. "Placing such power and discretion in the hands of a private individual •
is a serious departure from our general policy of conferring the administration
of criminal justice upon public officials." Statement by Senator Sam J. Ervin,
Jr., at the Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Federal Bail
Procedures, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1964).
15. California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, and New York are reported to have
such legislation. The prototype UNIFORm BAIL BOND Act, adopted by the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, requires all bondsmen and
their employees to serve an apprenticeship and pass a state licensing examination.
See FREED & WALD, op. cit. supra note 9, at 37-38.
16. S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-7 (1962).
17. 31 C.F.R. § 223 (1938). See also 6 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-15.
18. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
19. The State of Illinois has experimented with a similar ten percent plan.
See generally Proceedings of the Conference on Bail and Indigency, 1965 U.
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4. Supervision by a probation officer;
5. Daytime release;
6. Release in custody of a third party;
7. Reasonable restrictions on association or movement; or
8. Any other conditions deemed necessary.
The present Rule 46(d) provides that:
A person required or permitted to give bail shall execute a
bond for his appearance. One or more securities may be
required, cash or bonds or notes of the United States may
be accepted and in proper cases no security need be required.
This statute would seem to give the courts considerable leeway
in setting the conditions of release. Until recently, however,
courts normally have set a stated amount of security which the
accused is required to post20 or obtain through a bondsman. The
eighth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
excessive bail to assure that the defendant will gain his free-
dom,2 1 but even if only a modest bail is set the average defendant
cannot post the entire amount, so his release is entirely dependent
on the professional bondsman. If he cannot obtain the amount of
the required premium or if the bondsman is unwilling to under-
take the risk he is effectively and extra-judicially denied a
release.
22
The intransigent attitude of the courts in permitting such a
situation has been strongly criticized. 23 At present, proposals
have been made to amend Rule 46 (c) and (d) 24 by spelling out in
detail the court's obligation to consider in each case the indi-
20. See FED. R. CRim. P. 46(d). Absent express statutory authority a de-
posit in lieu of bail is not acceptable. See generally 8 Am. Jun. 2d Bail and
Recognizance § 84 (1963).
21. Stock v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951). The possibility of other constitutional
issues is discussed in Foote, The Coming Constitutimal Crises in Bail: II, 113
U. PA. L. REv. 1125 (1965). See also Bandy v. United States, 81 Sup. Ct. 197,
198 (1960) where Mr. Justice Douglas stated:
We have held that an indigent defendant is denied equal protection of the
law if he is denied an appeal on equal terms with other defendants, solely
because of his indigence. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Can an
indigent be denied freedom, where a wealthy man would not, because he
does not happen to have enough property to pledge his freedom?
22. Pannell v. United States, supra note 13.
23. E.g., Foote, Forward: Comment on the New York Bail Study, 106 U.
PA. L. REv. 685 (1958).
24. See 8 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 46.13 (2d ed. 1965). See generally
Sullivan, Proposed Rule 46 and the Right to Bail, supra note 7.
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vidual situation of the defendant and to impose tailored require-
ments which, consistent with the needs of justice, will be effective
in allowing his release.
The basic attitude of the courts, however, even under the pres-
ent statute, has begun to change. This is illustrated by two recent
cases from the District of Columbia.
In Pannell v. United States,25 the court of appeals was faced
with a request to grant a lesser bail pending appeal than that
allowed before conviction. Pannell had been convicted of violat-
ing federal narcotic statutes and was granted an appeal in forma
pauperis. The district court granted 5,000 dollars bail prior to
trial but denied bail pending appeal. In his application to the
court of appeals 26 he requested, if bail was granted, that the
amount be reduced to 2,500 dollars, because he could only afford
the premium on the lesser sum. His confinement subjected him to
a particular hardship since, while in jail, he was unable to make
suitable arrangements for his children.2 7 There was evidence that
he was a life-time resident in the jurisdiction and that, if re-
leased, employment could be arranged. Although the full court
(three judges sitting) believed bail should be granted, the ma-
jority, over a vigorous dissenting opinion, refused to allow per-
sonal circumstances to provide a basis for reducing the bail. The
seriousness of the offense was found to be controlling. The court
stressed the need for an amended bail statute but a special bail
procedure for the defendant was not considered.
In McCoy the court looked to the particular facts of the case
and held that it would be "manifestly unjust to allow the bonds-
men to 'hold the keys to the jail in their pockets.'" The court
departed from the normal procedures to fashion the following
terms of release to fit the individual case:
(1) Appellant is admitted to bail upon the execution of a
personal bond of 500 dollars, the bond to be signed by
appellant and any two of his close relatives-mother,
father, grandfather, two aunts, all of whom reside in
the District.
25. 320 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
26. FED. R. Cmtm. P. 46(a) (2) provides that "pending appeal to the court
of appeals, bail may be allowed by the trial judge, by the Court of Appeals, or
by any judge thereof or by the circuit justice" (i.e., a Supreme Court justice
sitting in this capacity).
27. Pannell's pregnant wife was appealing her conviction in the same case
and it was her desire that Pannell be released so that he could get a job and
make acceptable arrangements for their three children. They were living under
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(2) Appellant shall reside with a member of his family.
(3) Appellant shall report to the Probation Officer of the
U. S. District Court for the District of Columbia on
such terms as the latter may impose.28
The dissent agreed with the majority's approach in experi-
menting with more discriminating release procedures but be-
lieved that further inquiry into the possibility of danger to the
community and the likelihood of flight was required.
EoT.,Or D. THomsow
28. McCoy v. United States, - F2d - (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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DOMESTIC RELATIONS-Alimony-Right to support from
prior husband not revived by annulment of wife's subsequent
marriage. Denberg v. Frischman (N.Y. 1965).
In a separation agreement prior to divorce the plaintiff hus-
band agreed to support the defendant wife so long as she did
not remarry. She subsequently married and ceased all demands
on the husband. This second marriage was declared void ab
initio without fault on her part, and she then claimed that the
support obligation was revived since through judicial decree
she had not, in effect, remarried. The husband brought this ac-
tion for a declaratory judgment that he no longer had any
obligation to support the wife. On appeal from an order denying
the husband relief, held, reversed. A support obligation is not
revived by annulment of a former wife's void second marriage.
Denberg v. Fr sehman, 16 A.D.2d 877, 264 N.Y.S.2d 114 (1965).
(5-to-O).
The early approach to this problem of termination of support
rights by a void second marriage was contrary to Denberg V.
FAischman.' In Sutton v. Lieb2 the Seventh Circuit held that the
obligation of support not only was revived, but also that the
obligation continued while the wife was living with the second
husband. In reaching this result, the court applied a simple, logi-
cal rationale. Upon marriage a legal duty is imposed upon the
husband to support his wife." This duty survives the divorce of
the parties to the marriage and is embodied in either the separa-
tion agreement or the judicial decree of divorce. The woman is
legally entitled to support from only one husband, and if, after
divorce she enters into a valid second marriage, she accepts the
duty of support from her second husband and relinquishes the
right of support from her first. If, however, the second marriage
is void, it creates no duty to support, and thus she does not relin-
quish her right to support from her first husband and may
compel him to fulfill his obligation.4
1. Denberg v. Frischman, 16 A.D2d 877, 264 N.Y.S.2d 114 (1965). For a
case involving a voidable marriage see Sefton v. Sefton, 45 Cal.2d 872, 291
P.2d 439 (1955).
2. 199 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1952).
3. Reese v. Reese, 178 So. 2d 913, 916 (Fla. 1965).
4. Sutton v. Lieb, supra note 2; accord, Johnson County Nat'1 Bank &
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Logically this result cannot be attacked. A marriage, void
ab initio, has no legal effect on the parties to the marriage or
on the rights and duties existing between the parties and a third
person. From a social point of view the result is less clear.
Through its application the wife is not left without support,
which would be the case if the void second marriage was held
to terminate the obligation.5 However, the husband, having no
way of knowing the defect in the second marriage, may have
assumed new obligations in reliance upon the termination of his
duty to support. He always would be subjected to the possibility
of having the burden of supporting his first wife shifted back
on him.6
Recent cases, such as Denberg, have abandoned the view of
Button v. ieb7T in favor of a position which allows such mar-
riages to terminate support rights.8 The cases have split on the
significance of the woman's ability to obtain support from her
second husband. Some have indicated that a revival of support
rights occurs if the wife is not given the right of support from
the second husband after the annullment. 9 Her guilt or innocence
in entering into the second marriage is not a factor in these
decisions, but the intent to abandon her right to support from
her former husband seems to be controlling. Once she intention-
ally relinquishes her support rights she is thereafter estopped
from reasserting them,10 and apparently no overt act of the
husband in reliance upon the remarriage is necessary to enable
him to establish this estoppel. While not perfect in theory, the
result reached under this view is sound. It upholds the election of
the woman as to which husband she intends to look for support,
and it allows the former husband to conduct his affairs in an
atmosphere of certainty, enabling him to commit those monies to
5. Compare Sleicher v. Sleicher, 251 N.Y. 366, 167 N.E. 501 (1929) with
Gaines v. Jacobsen, 308 N.Y. 218, 124 N.E.2d 290 (1954).
6. See Denberg v. Frischman, 16 A.D.2d 877, 264 N.Y.S.2d 114 (1965);
Reese v. Reese, supra note 3; Gerrig v. Snierson, 344 Mass. 518, 183 N.E.2d
131 (1962).
7. 199 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1952).
8. Denberg v. Frischman, upra note 1; Reese v. Reese, supra note 3;
Gerrig v. Snierson, supra note 6.
9. Compare Reese v. Reese, supra note 3 and Gerrig v. Snierson, supra
note 6, with Denberg v. Frischman, supra note 1 and Gaines v. Jacobsen, supra
note 5.
10. Reese v. Reese, supra note 3.
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other uses without fear of having to resume alimony payments
at a future time.1
ROBEaT W. DBim, JR.
11. One valid exception to this rule occurs when the second marriage is void
due to the legal incompetency of the divorced woman. It has been held that
she is not only incapable of entering into a valid second marriage, but also
that she is incapable of abandoning her right to support from her former
husband.
One court set out the following factors to be considered in determining
whether the right of support is terminated by a second marriage:
1. Whether the wife is entitled to alimony or support from the subsequent
invalid marriage;
2. Whether the word "remarriage" means any kind of marriage ceremony
which is voluntarily entered into by the wife with the intention of
marrying;
3. Whether the marriage that is entered into gives rise to any status
and rights on the part of the wife;
4. Whether in the sound discretion of the court principles of justice and
fairness dictate a certain decision to avoid an unfortunate result;
5. Whether the principles of estoppel of waiver apply against the wife.
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INSURANCE-Conclusiveness of Judgment-Insurer not bound
by facts established against insured -where it claims injuries
intentionally caused. Sims v. Nationwide Mt. Ins. Go. (S.C.
1965).
After being involved in an automobile collision, the insured
(Sims) was sued by one of the injured parties on a complaint
alleging negligence. The insurer (Nationwide) was notified and
called on to defend the action, but it refused to do so, claiming
that the injury was in fact intentionally caused. A judgment
was obtained against Sims on the basis of negligence and he then
sued Nationwide for the amount of the judgment and attorney's
fees. The trial court held that since Nationwide had failed to
defend the prior action it was precluded from introducing evi-
dence inconsistent with the result of that action, and judgment
was given for Sims. On appeal to the South Carolina Supreme
Court, in a case of novel impression, held, reversed. Because of
the conflict of interests between the insurer and the insured, the
insurer could not in the prior action assert its defense of inten-
tional causation and at the same time defend the insured against
a charge of simple negligence. Therefore it should not be bound
by the results of that action establishing policy coverage. Sims
v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Go., 145 S.E.2d 523 (S.C. 1965).
(5-to-O).
Liability insurance policies commonly provide that the insurer
will defend any suit against the insured in which facts within
the policy coverage are alleged, regardless of whether the suit
is groundless, false or fraudulent, and if the insurer fails to
perform this duty it is liable for any expenses the insured incurs
in retaining private counsel. Also, the insurer is bound by all
pertinent and material facts established against the insured.1
The purpose of this doctrine is to prevent two suits involving the
same issues-one against the insured and the second against the
insurer for indemnity. It is assumed that the insured's and the
insurer's interests in opposing the third party's claim are
similar.
2
Public policy requires that these liability policies contain a
further provision excluding from coverage injuries caused inten-
tionally or at the direction of the insured. If the suit against the
1. See, e.g., Carolina Veneer & Lumber Co. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co.,
202 S.C. 103, 24 S.E2d 153 (1943).
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insured falls within this exclusion, of course, the insurer is under
no duty to defend and is not bound by facts proven against the
insured which would establish or negate coverage.
Since it usually cannot be ascertained before suit whether the
injuries occurred within the exclusion or not, the duty to defend
is normally determined from the allegations of the injured
party's complaint. If the complaint alleges only intentional acts,
the insurer may safely remain out of the case,4 but if the com-
plaint alleges unintentional acts or acts which may be found to
be intentional or unintentional the insurer is obligated to defend. 5
Difficulties in applying this general law occur where there
is a conflict between the known or ascertainable facts and the
allegations of the complaint. Probably, if the complaint alleges
only intentional conduct, the insurer need not defend regardless
of knowledge to the contrary on its part.6 If the complaint is
later amended, however, the insurer must at that time enter the
case.7 The courts have split on the question of the insurer's obli-
gation when the complaint alleges unintentional acts and the in-
surer either knows or believes that the acts were in fact inten-
tional.8 This was the issue presented to the South Carolina court
in Sim.g v. Nationwide Mut. L. Go.9
One line of cases has taken the position that the allegations of
the complaint continue to control. Illustrative of these is Miller
v. United States Fid. d- Guar. Co. 1° There, it appeared the in-
sured had intentionally run an automobile off the road, injuring
its occupant. Suit was brought and a judgment rendered against
him for negligence. The insurer had refused to defend and in
the insured's suit for indemnity attempted to set up facts show-
ing the intentional nature of the conduct. The court held that it
was precluded from doing so. The court said that when the
action against the insured is ostensibly within the terms of the
3. See Stout v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 307 F2d 521, 523 (4th Cir.
1962).
4. C.Y. Thomason Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 183 F.2d 729 (4th Cir.
1950) (applying S.C. law); Annot., 2 A.L.R.3d 1238, 1249 (1965).
5. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Hendrix, 199 F.2d 53 (4th Cir. 1952)
(applying S.C. law); Glens Falls Indem. Co. v. Atlantic Building Corp., 199
F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1952) (applying S.C. law).
6. E.g., Miller v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 291 Mass. 445, 197 N.E.
75 (1935).
7. See Harbin v. Assurance Co. of America, 308 F.2d 748 (10th Cir. 1962).
8. See Annot., 2 A.L.R.3d 1238, 1251 (1965).
9. 145 S.E2d 523 (S.C. 1965).
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policy, the insurer, whether it assumes the defense or refuses to
assume it, is bound by all matters decided which relate to cov-
erage. Further, this doctrine does not violate public policy. The
insured is not allowed to recover for his own intentional wrong
because it had been established by the court where the issue was
first tried that he was only negligent.
At least one case has carried this approach to extremes. In
Stefu8 v. London & Lancashire Indem. Co. of AmericaI l only
negligence was alleged in the action against the insured, but at
his trial the only proof offered related to intentional conduct.
The court in the later suit against the insurer, held that regard-
less of the proof, the allegations controlled, and, thus, the insurer
-was liable. A vigorous dissent stated that this result leaves the
insurer at the mercy of every unscrupulous litigant who, regard-
less of the facts, alleges a claim on which the insurance company
would be liable and then proves another claim on which no lia-
bility could attach. He can still collect because the insurer cannot
show the true facts.
Such a possibility of unfairness permitted the Fourth Circuit
in Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hammer=2 to fashion
a contrary doctrine that the practicalities of the case control.
The insured had been convicted of murder and was serving his
sentence when a civil suit was initiated on behalf of the de-
ceased and judgment rendered on a theory of negligence. The
court held that the insurer was not bound by the prior judgment
since it was not qualified to undertake the defense of the insured
and that this disqualification was due to the insured's own mis-
conduct. It was not possible for the insurer to defend the insured
and at the same time protect its own interests since a showing
that the acts of the insured were intentional would establish the
liability of the insured to the injured parties to an even greater
extent than that alleged in the complaint.
In 1962 the Fourth Circuit expressly affirmed these legal
principles in a case involving an almost identical fact situation.'3
The rule was stated thusly:
This does not mean that by a mere assertion of a conflict
of interest the insurer may excuse itself from its contractual
obligation to defend. It means only that, when there is an
11. 111 N.J.L. 6, 166 AUt. 339 (1933).
12. 177 F.2d 793 (4th Cir. 1949).
13. Stout v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 307 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1962).
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unresolved dispute as to the existence of this obligation, the
insurer is not required to participate in a tort proceeding
where the insurer's interest would be to prove a state of facts
which would establish or magnify the damaged party's claim
against the insured. But, if it should be later determined that
there is coverage, the insurer would be liable for the cost of
the defense independently arranged for by the insured, as
well as any judgment against him.14
The South Carolina Supreme Court in Sims adopted the prin-
ciples established by Hammer and quoted at length from that
opinion. In both Hammer and Stout the insured had been con-
victed of criminal charges prior to the filing of the civil suits.
There is no record in Sims that criminal charges were at any
time instituted or even contemplated. Apparently this is the
only factual distinction between this case and the earlier deci-
sions. This distinction, at most, is merely one of degree.
Jomr J. McKAY
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PLEADING-Filing of Counterclaim-No waiver of right to
change of venue when specifically reserved. Harmon v. Graham
(S.C. 1965).
The plaintiff Harmon instituted this suit in Richland County
after being involved there in an automobile accident. The de-
fendant was a resident of Darlington County. The defendant
moved for a change of venue to Darlington County' and then
filed an answer and counterclaim, specifically reserving his
rights under the motion. The plaintiff contended that the de-
fendant waived his right to a change of venue by filing his
counterclaim, since, in so doing, he had voluntarily invoked the
jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas of Richland County.
The trial court rejected this argument, and on appeal to the
Supreme Court of South Carolina, held, affirmed. There is no
waiver of the right to a change of venue through the filing of a
counterclaim, where such right has been specifically reserved.
Harmon v. 6Graham, 145 S.E.2d 521 (S.C. 1965). (5-to-O).
The view held by the majority of jurisdictions is that there is
no waiver of the right to a requested change of venue if an
answer is subsequently filed, unless by his conduct in the case
the defendant indicates an intention to invoke the jurisdiction
of the court. There is authority for the proposition that par-
ticipation in the pleadings, such as by requesting a continuance
or by filing a cross action, is a waiver of the right to a change of
venue.3 However none of the cases have dealt precisely with the
question presented in Harmon: Does the defendant waive his
right to a change of venue by filing a counterclaim although he
has specifically reserved his rights under the motion?
This case is one of first impression in South Carolina but not
one that was particularly difficult to solve. The plaintiff's case
was built around the theory that since a counterclaim is not man-
datory its filing amounts to the filing of a separate action arising
out of the same set of facts.4 The defendant relied principally
on the theory that where rights have been specifically reserved
there is no implied waiver. A waiver has been defined as "the
intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known right, or such
conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such
right."5 The South Carolina case of Barfield v. Southern Cotton
1. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-303 (1962).
2. 92 C.J.S. Venue § 124 (1944). Annot., 141 A.L.R. 1176 (1944).
3. 92 C.J.S. Venue §§ 124, 217 (1944).
4. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-652, 10-705 (1962); Collins v. Johnson, 242 S.C.
112, 130 S.E2d 185 (1963).
5. BLAcx, LAW DxcnoNARY (4th ed. 1951).
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Oil 0o.6 held that there was no waiver of the right to a change
of venue by reason of the filing of an answer, where such right
had been specifically reserved. The defendant argued in Harmon
that the holding should be extended to cases where in addition
to an answer, a counterclaim is filed and further he argued that
due to the substantive nature of the right to a change of venue
as held in Brice v. State & Co.7 and Shelton v. Southern Kraft
Corp." no waiver should result even if there is no reservation of
the right to a change of venue.
The South Carolina Supreme Court of course did not need to
consider the defendant's second argument in order to find for
him and consequently did not render an opinion on whether or
not there would have to be a reservation of the right in order
to prevent a waiver. However, there is a strong indication that
a reservation may not be necessary under the South Carolina
statutes. In addition, it has long been settled in South Carolina
that the right to a change of venue is not held to be waived even
though the motion comes after the filing of the answer.9 In such
a case there is no reservation of the right at all.
In reaching its decision the court relied primarily on a Cali-
fornia decision which held that there was no waiver when the
defendant filed an answer and cross complaint at the same time
he filed his motion for a change of venue. In California both
the right to a change of venue and the right to file a counter-
claim either with the answer or subsequently is guaranteed by
statute. The court observed that it would be unreasonable to hold
that by following the statute a privilege conferred by the statute
is lost. 10 A similar statutory situation exists in South Carolina.
Section 10-30311 gives the defendant a right to have the trial
take place in the county of his residence and 10-70512 gives him
the right to file a counterclaim. The South Carolina court con-
cluded that in line with the reasoning of the California court,
"it would be an anomaly . . . to hold that [the defendant] could
not assert his right under the latter section of the code without
waiving his right under the first mentioned section, which right
was expressly reserved."'
ROBEIRT M. EInamOiu, JR.
6. 87 S.C. 322, 69 S.E. 603 (1910).
7. 193 S.C. 137, 7 S.E.2d 850 (1940).
8. 195 S.C. 81, 10 S.E.2d 341 (1940).
9. E.g., Lee v. Neal, 233 S.C. 206, 104 S.E.2d 291 (1958); Brown v. Pal-
metto Baking Co., 220 S.C. 38, 66 S.E.2d 417 (1951) ; Nixon & Danforth v.
Piedmont Mut. Ins. Co., 74 S.C. 438, 54 S.E. 657 (1906).
10. Goss v. Brown, 64 Cal. 381, 221 Pac. 683 (1924).
11. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 10-303 (1962).
12. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 10-705 (1962).
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TORTS-Cause of Action-Action allowed where elements of
complaint did not fall into a single classic category of tort-
Morrison . NBC (N.Y. 1965).
Joseph L. Morrison, a member of the faculty at the University
of North Carolina, appeared on "21", a television quiz show
broadcast over NBC's network, on April 14, April 21, and April
28, 1958, losing to Elfrida Von Nordroff. In the fall of 1959 it
became widely known that the show "21" had been "fixed" since
some contestants had been briefed on questions and answers be-
fore going on the air.' Morrison sued in the New York courts,
claiming that, by being misled by the false representations of the
producers of the show into believing the show was fair, he par-
ticipated and, when the public scandal later occurred, sustained
harm to his reputation and was deprived of scholastic fellowships
for which he had applied. On appeal to the New York Supreme
Court, Appellate Division,2 held, although Morrison's case did
not rest on "prima facie tort,"3 or defamation, 4 or fraud or de-
ceit,5 or negligence,6 the conduct of the defendants and the harm
to Morrison "fall neatly within general principles of law, even
if not within any of the numbered forms of a form book."7 Mor-
rion v. NBC, 266 N.Y.S.2d 406 (App. Div. 1965). (3-to-2).
1. See In re Application of Melody Music, Inc. (WGMA), 36 F.C.C. 701,
702-05 (1964) for a brief description of the actions of defendants Barry and
Enright in how they went about fixing the show and their actions before a
grand jury.
2. See Record on Appeal, p. 71, Morrison v. NBC, 266 N.Y.S.2d 406 (App.
Div. 1965). The present case as it appeared before the Appellate Division was
cast in a series of complicating motions. In a prior hearing, Morrison v. NBC,
243 N.Y.S.2d 927 (Sup. Ct. 1963), five causes of action were stated. Motions
were made by defendants to strike these and this was granted as to all but
the first, the court stating, "The first cause is rested as plaintiff states on a
claim of defamation by association." 243 N.Y.S.2d at 928. The defendants ap-
pealed this ruling. The lower court went on to hold, however, that the cause
of action was barred by the statute of limitations. This ruling is appealed by
Morrison.
3. "[M]isplaced speculation about the applicability of prima facie tort doc-
trine to this case should be eliminated." Morrison v. NBC, 266 N.Y.S.2d 406,
409 (App. Div. 1965). See Halpern, Intentional Torts and the Restatement, 7
BUFFALO L. REV. 7 (1957).
4. "[T]he claim is not for defamation because defendants did not publish
in any form anything derogatory to or concerning plaintiff." Morrison v. NBC,
266 N.Y.S.2d at 410.
5. "[T]he acts of defendants are not in deceit although they fit precisely
all but one of the several elements of deceit. They fall short with respect to
the nature of the harm sustained by plaintiff." 266 N.Y.S.2d at 410.
6. "The claim is not for negligence because, while the harm may not have
been intended, the act and effect of putting plaintiff into the false position of
appearing to be a cheater was." 266 N.Y.S.2d at 410.
7. 266 N.Y.S.2d at 410. By not classifying Morrison's cause of action as
libel or slander the court removed the bar of the one-year statute of limitations.
The applicable statute was the six-year statute of limitations.
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Morrison is but one of a number of cases which have been
brought in New York by persons who were the innocent parties
on the quiz shows involved in the fixing scandals.8 Although
these cases have different results,9 they do show the difficulty
one jurisdiction is having with litigation arising from television
which involves the general area of harm to one's reputation.
When there has been harm to one's reputation, the normal
means of adjudicating this wrong lies in defamation"' which is,
in turn, made up of the twin torts of libel and slander.11 The
8. Holt v. CBS, 22 App. Div. 2d 791, 253 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1964); Fried-
lander v. NBC, 20 App. Div. 2d 701, 246 N.Y.S.2d 889, reversing 241 N.Y.S.2d
477 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Davidson v. NBC, 204 N.Y.S.2d 532 (Sup. Ct. 1960)
Goldberg v. CBS, 205 N.Y.S.2d 611 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Goostree v. Lorillard,
202 N.Y.S.2d 456 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Clark v. NBC, 195 N.Y.S.2d 940 (Sup.
Ct. 1960) (defendant's motion to strike certain parts from complaint denied);
aff'd mcr., 11 App. Div. 2d 642, 203 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (1960); rehearing, 209
N.Y.S.2d 60 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (cause of action of libel by virtue of extrinsic facts
requires a showing of special damages and plaintiff set forth only what may
be regarded as general damages).
9. In Friedlander v. NBC, 241 N.Y.S.2d 477 (Sup. Ct. 1963), the Supreme
Court of New York County dismissed Friedlander's causes of action, in a fac-
tual situation similar to that in Morrison, for prima facie tort ("Damage is an
essential element in a cause of action for prima facie tort and must be pleaded
specially." 241 N.Y.S.2d at 479, quoting from Leather Dev. Corp. v. Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc., 15 App. Div. 2d 761, 761, 224 N.Y.S.2d 513, 514 (1962)), fraud
and deceit ("[T]here is nothing in the allegations from which an inference may
be reasonably drawn that plaintiff was damaged by reason of his participation
in the program is shown", 241 N.Y.S.2d at 480), and conspiracy ("There is no
cause of action for civil conspiracy. Allegations of conspiracy serve only to
connect defendants with the acts of co-conspirators." 241 N.Y.S.2d at 481), but
dismissed defendant's motion to strike the cause of action for breach of contract.
The court reasoned that when the defendants accepted Friedlander as a con-
testant, an implied agreement arose on the part of the defendants that the quiz
show would be conducted honestly. On appeal, Friedlander v. NBC, 20 App.
Div. 2d 701, 246 N.Y.S.2d 889 (1964), the Appellate Division granted the
motion to strike the cause of action for breach of contract stating, "[Ilt is
clear that mere participation by a person in a particular enterprise does not
necessarily charge him with responsibility as a principal upon contracts made
or implied in furtherance of the enterprise" Id. at 701, 246 N.Y.S2d at 890.
10. See Donnelly, History of Defamation, 1949 Wis. L. REv. 99; Lovell, The
'Reception' of Defamation by the Common Law, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1051 (1962) ;
Veeder, History and Theory of Law of Defamation, Part 1, 3 COLum. L. REv.
546 (1903); Veeder, History and Theory of Law of Defamation, 4 COLUm. L.
REv. 33 (1904).
11. Libel is divided into libel per se and libel per quod. Words slanderous
per se are words which intrinsically, without innuendo, import injury, and
are words from which damage ... flows as a natural consequence. From
such words malice is implied and damages are conclusively presumed to
result. Courts take judicial notice of damage resulting from libel or
slander per se. On the other hand, words slanderous per quod are those
whose injurious effect must be established by due allegation and proof,
and in order to state a cause of action for libel or slander per quod, as
distinguished from libel or slander per se, the special damage or damages
resulting therefrom must be alleged, a mere general allegation of dam-
ages being insufficient.
Koerner v. Lawler, 180 Kan. 318, 321, 304 P2d 926, 929 (1956). See generally
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advent of radio and television has caused much activity in this
area of tort law mainly because the written-spoken distinction
is inapplicable when the defamatory remarks are broadcast over
wavelengths to unknown audiences. 12 In seeking a means to
vindicate Morrison's alleged harm,'3 this court struck out on a
new path in sustaining Morrison's cause of action. The court
declared that even if Morrison failed to state a cause of action
because the separate elements of his complaint did not fall into
any one classic category of tort, it would not "suffer a hardening
of its categories making neither for sense nor justice" since this
would "mark a return to a specious procedural formalism."
14
In writing about the Anglo-American method of jurispru-
dence, Dean Roscoe Pound once stated:
[O]ur common law has the means of developing [new
premises] to meet the exigencies of justice and of molding
the results into a scientific system. Moreover it has the
power of acquiring new premises . . . .Indeed fundamental
changes have been taking place in our legal system almost
unnoticed, and a shifting was in progress in our case law
from the individualistic justice of the nineteenth century,
which has passed so significantly by the name of legal jus-
tice, to the social justice of today .... "I
This idea of the law as a moving body and its application to
tort law was at one time disputed between those who felt the
law of tort was based on general principles16 and those who felt
that it should be based on specific remedies. 17 One obvious ex-
ample of this growth based on general principles is the develop-
12. See, e.g., PRossER, TORTS 771-72 (3d. ed. 1964). See also EMERY, BROAD-
CASTING AND GOVERNMENT 274-77 (1961); O'Neil, Television, Tort Law, and
Federalism, 53 CAL. L. REv. 421 (1965); Note, 42 VA. L. REv. 63 (1956). In
the lower court, it was held that Morrison had stated a cause of action for de-
famation by association, Morrison v. NBC, 243 N.Y.S.2d 927 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
In the present case, the appellate division dismissed this for lack of publication,
supra note 4.
13. "The claim then charges defendants with corrupt purposes, lying to
plaintiff to induce his innocent participation in a corrupt enterprise, as a result
of which, on public exposure of the enterprise, plaintiff sustained harm to his
reputation and academic prospects." Morrison v. NBC, 266 N.Y.S2d 406, 409,
(App. Div. 1965).
14. 266 N.Y.S.2d at 409.
15. POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE Como LAW 158 (3d ed. 1931).
16. See POL.LCN, TORTs 16-17 (15th ed. ).
17. See SAizMoND, ToRTs 17-31 (12th ed. ).
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ment of the right of privacy.' 8 The law of torts, then, is far from
being static or stationary since one cannot say where the limits
of its development will be set. Whenever it appears that one
person's interests are entitled to protection against another's
conduct, "the mere fact that the claim is novel will not of itself
operate as a bar to the remedy."' 9
In the past, the courts of New York have not limited them-
selves to specific categories.20 In an early case, Lucciv . Engel,
2 '
for example, the court held that an action on the case would be
proper "where existing forms of action did not give a remedy."
22
More recently, in Penn-Ohio SteeZ Corp. v. Allis-Chakmers
23
there is dictum to the effect that it was not necessary to sustain
a cause of action that the pleading allege defendant was moti-
vated in making a false statement by a desire to injure the plain-
tiff. "It is enough if the falsehoods charged were intentionally
uttered and did in fact cause the plaintiff to suffer actual dam-
age in his economic or legal relationships."
24
If it may be assumed that Morrison does come within the
classification of action on the case, or some other broad undefined
"catch-all" category of tort law since the defendants' actions
18. The right to privacy had its beginning in an article written by Samuel D.
Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HAnv. L. REv. 93 (1890). In that article the authors reviewed cases in which
relief had been granted on the basis of defamation, invasion of some property
right, and breach of confidence or an implied contract and concluded that a
broader principal ran throughout the cases which deserved separate recognition.
See PROSSER, TORTS 829-51 (3d ed. 1964).
19. PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 18, at 3.
20. See Gale v. Ryan, 263 App. Div. 76, 31 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1941) where a
cause of action was upheld when Gale was investigated by tax authorities as a
result of false statements given by Ryan. The court stated:
While everyone is subject to investigation ... with respect to his income,
it is the allegation of the complaint that the plaintiff has wrongfully
been subjected to investigation through the improper actions of these de-
fendants and that he has been ... otherwise damaged. Under the allega-
tions of the complaint, we think that the plaintiff has stated a cause of
action which has received recognition."
Id. at 78, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 734.
21. 73 N.Y.S.2d 78 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
22. 73 N.Y.S.2d at 79. The court held, however, that in Lucci the allegations
made out a cause of action in libel and that if it were described as an action on
the case, the effect would be to allow Lucci to escape the one-year statute of
limitations applicable to libel.
23. 7 App. Div. 2d 441, 184 N.Y.S.2d 58 (1959).
24. Id. at 444, 184 N.Y.S.2d at 61. The court went on to decide, however,
that the complaint was insufficient because of a failure to allege special damages
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may not be classified as defamatory, 5 and that the harm did not
flow "directly from the false position ...into which plaintiff
was put, but rather from the public exposure that was likely to
follow,"26 the question of damages becomes the crucial point.
In Zausuerv'v. Fotochrome Ine.,27 the court stated:
[W]hen causes of action are pleaded in tort for intentional
harms falling outside the categories of the 'conventional' or
'traditional' torts, special damages must be alleged and sub-
sequently proven . . . . [S]pecial damages must be alleged
with sufficient particularity to identify actual losses and
related causally to the alleged Tortious Act.
2 8
In Morrison, however, the court departed from this rule and
stated that recovery should not depend on allegations as proof
of special damages by analogizing Morrison's harm to that for
which the law of defamation allows recovery in the way of gen-
eral damages.29 The test was whether the "loss is a direct and
natural consequence of the wrongdoing."80
Since there is no traditional remedy for which Morrison quali-
fies, the court has, in effect, created a new cause of action. For
this reason, and because the analogy of Morrison's harm to that
which normally results from defamation is, at best, remote, it
25. The action for injurious falsehood is distinguished from an action of
libel or slander . . . , the former action is one on the case for damages
willfully and intentionally done without just cause, occasion (sic), or
excuse, and, since the false statement injures him only by misleading other
persons into action that is detrimental to him, it is governed by more
lenient rules of liability ....
86 C.J.S. Torts § 48, at 971 (1954).
26. Morrison v. NBC, 266 N.Y.S.2d 406, 413 (App. Div. 1965).
27. 18 App. Div. 2d 649, 235 N.Y.S2d 698 (1962).
28. Id. at 649, 235 N.Y.S.2d at 699.
29. Morrison v. NBC, supra note 26, at 415. Yet the court earlier states:
There has been some discussion whether plaintiff's reputation could have
been harmed, turning on whether it was reasonable ... for the public to
generalize that the corruption exposed applied to all rather than only to
some of the contestants in the rigged contest That is a question of fact.
The pleading alleges that it happened. The proof of the pleading may well
be another matter.
266 N.Y.S.2d at 414.
30. 266 N.Y.S.2d at 416. Commenting on this method of reasoning, Pro-
fessor McCormick writes:
It seems dubious, however whether this (rationale) corresponds with the
facts. Injury to reputation and into feelings, allowable as 'general' dam-
ages, are by no means the inevitable results of a false accusation. It is
believed that, in truth, the requirements about special damage rest, not
upon any analytical distinction, but wholly upon the historical division
between defamations.
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would appear that he should be required to show that he has
been specially damaged.31 To hold otherwise would open the
courts to untold litigation against tortfeasors whose action, while
not falling within any of the classic tort categories, may have
nevertheless resulted in some harm to another.
3 2
JAmEs C. BLA=nY, Jn.
31. A plaintiff does not necessarily fail to maintain his action because the
language is non-defamatory but he is obliged to prove his case much more
fully. Certain points whose existence is 'presumed' in a case of defamation
are required to be proved if the language is non-defamatory.
Smith, Torts without Particular Names, 69 U. PA. L. Rxv. 91, 105 n. 44 (1921).
32. As of this writing, the attorneys for NBC and the other defendants have
filed for permission to appeal this decision to the court of appeals rather than
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TRADE REGULATIONS - Unfair or Deceptive Advertising
Practices--"Buy 1, Get 1 Free"--FTC v. Mary Carter Paint Co.
(Sup. Ct. 1965).
Between 1955 and 1960, Mary Carter Paint Company increased
its sales from one million dollars to twelve million dollars, a
growth attributable at least in part to its merchandising practice
of setting the price of a can of its paint equal to that of national
brand paints of comparable quality and advertising and giving
a second can free of extra charge.1 Pursuant to this practice, such
advertising slogans as "Buy 1, Get 1 Free" and "Every Second
Can Free of Extra Cost" were employed. In 1961, proceedings
before the Federal Trade Commission 2 resulted in a determina-
tion that such advertising was false and misleading in violation
of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.8 On petition
for review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit set aside the order as "impermissibly vague."4 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and, held, reversed and remanded to the
Commission for clarification of its order. Although there was
some ambiguity in the Commission's opinion, its determination
could not be said to be arbitrary or clearly erroneous. FTC V.
Mary Carter Paint Co., 382 U.S. 46 (1965). (8-to-1). 5
It is not an uncommon practice for an article to be advertised
as "free" where a condition to its receipt is the purchase of some
other article at a stated price. The former is "free" only because
it is without additional cost to the purchaser. It is not free in
the sense that it is given away absolutely and unconditionally
-with no strings attached, or that it is motivated by a "detached
and disinterested generosity,"8 or that the seller does not expect
to recoup its cost out of the price he obtains for the articles sold.7
It is probably for this reason that the Federal Trade Commission
has taken inconsistent positions regarding the use of the -word
"free".
Initially, Book-of-the-Month Club, Inc.8 prohibited the use of
the word "free" to describe merchandise which was not in fact
1. See Mary Carter Paint Co. v. FTC, 333 F2d 654, 655 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1964).
2. Mary Carter Paint Co., 60 F.T.C. 1827 (1962).
3. FEDERAL TRADE CommissioN AcT § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
4. Mary Carter Paint Co. v. FTC, 333 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1964).
5. Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting, would not have disturbed the judgment of
the court of appeals.
6. Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956).
7. See Mary Carter Paint Co., 60 F.T.C. 1827, 1853-66 (1962) (Elman,
Commissioner, dissenting).
8. 48 F.T.C. 1297, 1307 (1952).
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given as a gift or gratuity or was not given without requiring the
purchase of some other merchandise or the performance of some
other service. Later, however, significant changes in the member-
ship of the Commission led to a reappraisal of its earlier position
and the enunciation of the so-called "free rule" in the Black0
case. Accordingly, an article could be advertised as "free" even
though the purchase of another article was required, so long as
the terms of the offer were clearly and conspicuously set forth,
the price of the article required to be purchased was not in-
creased, and its quality and quantity were not diminished.10
Although Mary Carter seemingly complied with the require-
ments of the Black case "free rule," the Commission held the rule
not to be an all encompassing regulation. It noted that a neces-
sary corollary to the rule was that an article cannot be advertised
as "free" which can be obtained only on the purchase of a second
article if the article required to be purchased has no established
market price. Mary Carter, having always sold paint buckets in
matched pairs, misrepresented in effect that the stated price for
the two was the customary price for one can. The fact that the
purchaser was given no concession when the "free" can was not
taken did not cure the misrepresentation.
The order was challenged by the dissenting commissioner, the
court of appeals, and MNfr. Justice Harlan in dissent, not as an
erroneous and untenable proposition of law, but as confusing,
unpermissibly vague, and not "sufficiently clear and precise to
avoid raising serious questions as to [its] meaning and appli-
cation."" Where the Black case was clearly intended to formu-
late an authoritative and complete exposition of the Commis-
sion's position on the subject and to give the businessmen of the
United States a "clear and unequivocal answer,"' 2 the FTC
opinion here was "no more than a generality of legal statement
which lacks any precision of meaning adequate to satisfy the
requirement of clarity."' 3 Conceding this point, the Commission
requested and got a remand of the case for clarification of its
order.14
9. Walter J. Black, Inc., 50 F.T.C. 225 (1953). Book-of-the-Month Club,
Inc. was also reopened and substantially modified. 50 F.T.C. 778 (1954).
10. See Guide V, Guides Against Deceptive Pricing, 23 Fed. Reg. 7965 (1958).
For the current guide, see Guide IV, 29 Fed. Reg. 180 (1964).
11. FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 368 U.S. 360, 368 (1962).
12. Walter J. Black, Inc., 50 F.T.C. 225, 232 (1953).
13. Mary Carter Paint Co. v. FTC, 333 F.2d 654, 656 (5th Cir. 1964).
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Awaiting the Commission's forthcoming clarification, it ap-
pears that its argument with the use of the word "free" in the
Mary Carter context is that the offer of the "free" article is open
to all alike; that, being unlimited both in point of time or area,
it affords the recipient no comparative advantage; that in fact
it does not involve the giving away of a free article; and that
the intended beneficiaries of the statute-the ignorant, the un-
thinking, and the incredulous' 5-should be protected in their
justifiable belief that when they are offered something "free"
they are getting "something for nothing." If this is the reasoning
of the Commission, it would indeed be unfortunate to limit its
application to this one aspect of our national life.
J. KENDiA Fnw
15. Charles of the Ritz Distnb. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944).
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